Snapshot

The recent breakdown of the reported rapprochement in early October between Boko Haram’s JAS faction and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has reignited violent clashes across the Lake Chad region. What initially appeared to be a potential merger of two major jihadist groups has instead devolved into a brutal turf war, offering Nigeria and its regional partners a fleeting but significant strategic opportunity. This moment of internal discord could be leveraged to weaken both factions—if managed through intelligence precision, coordinated operations, and a stabilisation approach that prioritises civilian protection.

The renewed fighting is rooted in the reported killing of a JAS tax collector by ISWAP, but it also reflects deeper ideological fractures—particularly disagreements over civilian targeting, which intensified after JAS fighters attacked Darul Jama in Bama, killing 60 civilians. While multiple triggers contributed to the escalation, the underlying drivers are strategic. Both factions are engaged in a contest for control of critical mobility corridors, including road networks, supply routes, and the waterways used to tax fishing communities. Dominance over these logistical arteries directly influences revenue generation, territorial authority, and recruitment pipelines. Ultimately, the confrontation is less about isolated incidents and more about determining which faction can consolidate primacy across the Lake Chad Basin’s economic and operational landscape.

Fighting has intensified around the Lake chad,  Mandara, Kukawa, and Ngulde, with both groups claiming gains through ambushes, raids, and offensives deep into rival strongholds. The conflict mirrors earlier episodes of infighting between 2021 and 2023, when power struggles and ideological rifts led to the death of JAS leader Abubakar Shekau. As before, the clashes expose weaknesses that Nigeria’s security forces can exploit. When insurgents fight each other, they inadvertently reveal and leave vulnerable their supply chains, patrol patterns, recruitment networks, and the local actors who sustain their operations. These are critical intelligence seams that, if rapidly exploited, could degrade the insurgency’s operational capacity.

To seize this opportunity, Nigeria must strengthen intelligence integration and coordination. Information from local communities, intercepted communications, and embedded intelligence cells should be fused into a unified system that directly informs special operations and interdiction missions. Rather than focusing solely on killing fighters, operations should target the logistics that keep both groups functioning, fuel depots, food convoys, ransom channels, and arms suppliers. Air power should be used in a precise and intelligence-led manner when legitimate targets are identified on the battlefield and prioritise strikes on the actual fighting zone where rival jihadist factions are clashing.

Equally important is the need to stabilise local communities during this temporary reduction in attacks on civilians. Civil-military coordination should be strengthened to protect population centres, restore essential services, and expand trust-based engagement with local actors. These measures are crucial for denying extremist groups the ability to re-establish influence among displaced or vulnerable populations. Programmes that facilitate safe surrender, vetting, and reintegration of low-level combatants, paired with livelihood support, can help fracture group cohesion from within.

Cross-border cooperation with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger remains critical. Without coordinated border surveillance and intelligence-sharing, fighters can easily move across porous frontiers to escape pressure and regroup in neighbouring territories. Sustained collaboration within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) framework will be vital to contain the conflict geographically and ensure that tactical gains translate into strategic progress.

Nigeria’s ability to turn this internal insurgent conflict into a strategic advantage will depend on the speed and discipline of its response. Rapid interdiction of supply routes, targeted air and ground operations, and proactive community engagement could transform this turf war into a window for dismantling both factions. Failure to act cohesively, or to protect civilians in the process, would instead allow one group to emerge stronger and prolong the cycle of instability.

The ongoing ISWAP–JAS conflict is more than a clash between rival insurgents—it is a test of Nigeria’s strategic agility. By fusing intelligence, precision, and protection, Nigeria can shift from being a spectator of jihadist infighting to an active architect of its decline.