Across the Sahel, the balance of power between state forces and armed groups is no longer being determined primarily on the ground. It is being shaped in the air. From Nigeria to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, conflict dynamics are increasingly defined by aerial visibility, mobility denial, and persistent surveillance rather than by troop density or territorial occupation. This shift is not doctrinal or aspirational; it is imposed by operational reality. Highly mobile jihadist and bandit networks among them Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Islamic State West Africa Province, and Islamic State Sahel Province have consistently exploited vast, weakly governed terrain faster than ground-centric counterinsurgency models can respond. In this environment, airpower is no longer a supporting capability. It is becoming the decisive instrument through which states observe, constrain, and shape armed movement.

Past conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen demonstrate that airpower cannot substitute for political settlement or governance. The Sahel, however, presents a distinct operational equation. Its open plains, sparse population density, and porous borders reward speed, dispersion, and concealment. Armed groups routinely traverse distances that static deployments and patrol-based ground forces cannot credibly dominate. Under these conditions, the decisive advantage lies not in episodic strikes, but in persistent aerial oversight that steadily erodes armed groups’ freedom of manoeuvre and ability to surprise. Geography sits at the core of this shift. Armed actors exploit forests, open savannahs, and rugged terrain. Argon’s open-source monitoring has repeatedly identified armed group convoys and logistical movements transiting these corridors toward intended targets. The challenge is not detection, but inconsistent integration of air assets into routine battlefield denial. Across much of the Sahel, airpower remains centrally controlled and episodically deployed reserved for strategic strikes or crisis response rather than embedded in daily interdiction. This gap allows armed groups to exploit mobility faster than ground forces can react.

Nigeria’s counterterrorism operations in Sambisa Forest and the wider Lake Chad Basin illustrate both progress and limitation. Expanded use of aerial surveillance and strike platforms has degraded fixed insurgent infrastructure and constrained large-scale movement. Yet similar integration has not been applied consistently against fluid bandit and jihadist networks operating across the North-West, North-Central, and emerging southern corridors. The movement of suspected Lakurawa elements toward lower-pressure zones following US military airstrike highlights this gap. Fully integrated tactical airpower would enable earlier detection, pre-emptive disruption, and denial of escape corridors shifting airpower from reactive punishment to proactive mobility denial.

A critical doctrinal evolution with Sahel-wide relevance is the decentralisation of airpower. Nigeria’s move toward an Army Aviation capability reflects growing recognition that reliance on centrally controlled air force assets introduces delay and misalignment at the tactical level. Traditional joint-force models treat airpower as a theatre-level resource rather than a point-of-contact capability. An army-controlled aviation wing centred on rotary-wing and light platforms offers a practical alternative, enabling rapid insertion and extraction, casualty evacuation, continuous overwatch, and immediate interdiction, particularly against motorbike convoys that dominate armed-group mobility.

Decentralisation carries risks, including command-and-control complexity and airspace deconfliction, but these are manageable through clear rules of engagement and joint planning. The cost of delayed or absent air support is far greater. Where forward deployment of aviation assets remains uneven, airpower risks remaining a conceptual advantage rather than an operational one.

Beyond manned platforms, unmanned aerial systems are reshaping the future of tactical airpower in the Sahel. Fighter aircraft retain deterrent value but are scarce, costly, and poorly suited to persistent area denial. Drones offer a more scalable solution for reconnaissance, border monitoring, infrastructure protection, and precision interdiction. Even limited deployments dozens rather than hundreds of systems can sustain continuous presence at a fraction of the cost of manned sorties. As jihadist groups experiment with drones for surveillance and attack, control of the aerial domain at both high and low altitude is becoming a prerequisite for control on the ground.

This contest is already being shaped by non-state actors. Islamic State Sahel Province’s January 2026 attack on Niger’s Air Base 101, which involved drone usage and resulted in aircraft damage, underscores that jihadist groups recognise the strategic value of airpower and are actively seeking to deny states this advantage. Armed groups routinely adapt within months acquiring and weaponising commercial drones while Sahelian states face procurement cycles measured in years. Bureaucratic bottlenecks embedded in foreign defence partnerships, including approval delays and end-use restrictions, create an asymmetric disadvantage in which non-state actors innovate faster than governments can field countermeasures. This reinforces the strategic case for local production, maintenance, and rapid fielding capacity.

The shift toward tactical airpower therefore carries significant industrial implications. Growing demand for drones, sensors, and aviation support systems presents an opportunity to localise production and tailor capabilities to Sahel-specific conditions. In Nigeria, institutions such as the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria, alongside private-sector firms, are positioned to reduce external dependence and strengthen supply-chain resilience. Failure to scale indigenous ISR, maintenance, and drone production capacity represents a missed opportunity at a moment when operational demand and industrial feasibility are unusually well aligned.

Concerns about civilian harm inevitably accompany any expansion of airpower. Yet poorly integrated airpower is more likely to increase civilian risk than disciplined, intelligence-led deployment. Looking ahead, the Sahelian battlespace will be defined by control of the vertical domain. States that transition from centralised, episodic airpower to decentralised, tactically integrated aerial control will regain the ability to deny armed groups mobility and initiative. Those that fail to adapt will continue to cede advantage, regardless of ground-force size or expenditure. In a region this vast and exposed, armed groups retain freedom of action only when the state lacks the capability or the will to keep its eyes in the sky.